I would 1 like to thank Goodman (1) and Savitz and Olshan (2) for their responses. Each in their own way throws more light on these difficult problems. It is often the case that when people with different views on a controversial subject begin to exchange ideas, they find that the differences between them are not so great after all. The reply by Savitz and Olshan, in particular, makes me suspect that this is what is happening here.
My feeling is that our problem as epidemiologists is not that we dismiss meaningful results, as Savitz and Olshan discuss in their reply, but rather that our journals are full of results that either are wrong or are stated with a confidence that they do not deserve. I wonder if it isn't this difference in outlook that drives the controversy. Savitz and Olshan are concerned about "unjustified dismissal of meaningful results" (3, p. 904), while I am more worried by the exaggeration of evidence. These gut feelings may be behind our more rational discussion.
It has been suggested that epidemiology is going through a difficult time as it struggles to identify small, but important, risk factors (4) . The reputation of all epidemiologists is diminished every time a health scare based on our work reaches the press, but then turns out to have been exaggerated. One of the reasons for these scares is that too often p values are used as indicators of the strength of evidence. Even in simple randomized trials, p values tend to exaggerate the evidence against a meaningful null hypothesis, but in complex observational work, the p value can be particularly misleading and is easily misused. Epidemiologists do not need to be encouraged to adopt methods, such as ignoring multiple comparisons or thinking of hypotheses based on the data, that produce even more "significant" p values.
Goodman (1) rightly emphasizes the distinction between the approach of Fisher (5) and that of Neyman and Pearson (6) . However, when giving advice on the methodology for hypothesis testing, we must remem-ber that most epidemiologists do not make that distinction, and they will choose ideas from both sides and use them together. It seems to me that Fisher's approach is too simplistic and contains basic flaws, while Neyman and Pearson's approach is logical but does not apply to the type of research undertaken by epidemiologists. Bayesian methods do offer a solution to this problem, although, in practice, it may not be a straightforward one or even a comfortable one, for it forces us to confront the subjective element in the interpretation of evidence.
My best guess is that, over the next 10 years, the use of p values in epidemiology will greatly diminish, and I am sure that when p values finally go, confidence intervals will be abandoned soon after, even if the name lives on as a description of Bayesian or likelihood intervals. In the place of p values, we will adopt Bayesian methods of analysis much better suited to bringing together the many different forms of evidence that epidemiologists use. We are, then, discussing how to make the best of a bad job in the medium term. I would suggest that we need to discourage the use of p values, but when they are used, we must point out that in isolation they are not good indicators of the strength of evidence. What we must not do is advocate methods that will enable researchers to attach the label "significant" to even more findings that, in truth, are based on weak evidence.
